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Abstract
We examine the e⁄ects of providing more accurate information to a political decision-
maker who is lobbied by competing interests. Conventional wisdom holds that such a bias
in the direction of the correct decision improves the e¢ ciency of government. We provide
a formal de￿nition of bias which is derived from the same fundamentals that give rise to a
contest model of lobbying. E¢ ciency of government is measured by both the probability of
taking the correct decision and the amount of social waste associated to lobbying activities.
We present a benchmark model in which increasing the bias always improves the e¢ ciency of
government under both criteria. However, this result is fragile in the sense that reasonable
alternative assumptions in the micro-foundations lead to slightly di⁄erent models in which
￿due to di⁄erent strategic e⁄ects of bias ￿under either criterion there is no guarantee that
more accurate information improves government.
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Situations in which political decision-makers have to take decisions under uncertainty abound.
In many cases there exists a possibility to invest in additional information (e.g. research, policy
evaluations or hearings) in order to obtain more accurate information. Such an investment
biases the decision in the direction of the correct decision. Conventional wisdom holds that such
a bias improves the e¢ ciency of government. This paper analyzes whether this is true when the
decision-maker is lobbied by competing interests.
A prominent way to capture lobbying by competing interests is through a contest model. Lob-
bies compete by making irreversible outlays, while the success of lobbying is non-deterministic
and governed by a so-called contest success function. In this paper we focus on two compet-
ing lobbies A and B who make outlays eA and eB, respectively. A contest success function
associates, to each vector of e⁄orts (eA;eB), a lottery specifying for each agent a probability of
getting the object. That is, ￿(eA;eB) is such that, for each i 2 fA;Bg, ￿i(eA;eB) ￿ 0, and
￿A (eA;eB)+￿B (eA;eB) = 1. It is assumed that the decision-maker commits to determine the
winner through the contest success function ￿. The standard starting point for the strategic
analysis of contest games is then the following speci￿cation. Given a contest success function ￿
and the vector of e⁄orts (eA;eB), the lobbies￿expected utility from participating in the contest
is given by
E￿i (eA;eB) = ￿i (eA;eB)Vi ￿ ei; for i 2 fA;Bg: (1)
In his 1980 paper Gordon Tullock proposed the by now ￿ classical￿rent-seeking game. He
speci￿ed a proportional form which prescribes in its simplest version (under constant returns to
scale) that the probability of winning of the interest groups, given a vector of lobbying e⁄orts




for i 2 fA;Bg: (2)
Moreover, in the seminal paper in which Gordon Tullock introduced these contest games in
general and a more general functional form of the contest success function in equation (2), he
also makes the following assertion (p. 109 and p. 111):
￿...One way to lower the social costs is to introduce bias into the selection
process. Note that we normally refer to bias as a bad thing, but one could be biased
in the direction of the correct decision. ...we would like to have court proceedings
biased in such a way that whoever is on the right side need not to make very large
investments in order to win, and if this is true, the people on the wrong side will not
make very large investments either, because they do not pay.￿
￿...this kind of bias ...would have very large payo⁄s, not only in reducing rent-
seeking activity but also in increasing e¢ ciency of government in general.￿
Note that this quote not only provides a statement of the conventional wisdom. It also







 what follows we will use this quote as a guide to our analysis in several respects. On one hand,
it will prove helpful for the understanding of the underlying forces in biased contest games to
see whether Tullock￿ s intuition applies to these games. On the other hand, the quote suggests
two e¢ ciency criteria:
￿ Social waste: it is desirable that bias reduces overall rent-seeking activity.
￿ Taking the correct decision: it is desirable that bias improves government in general.
Note that while with the second criterion points at a very important property of contests,
the rent-seeking literature has so far only concentrated on the ￿rst e¢ ciency criterion. Taking
into account the second criterion requires to formalize the idea of a ￿ correct￿decision in a contest
game. We do so by deriving both the notion of bias and the crucial element in the speci￿cation
of a contest game, the contest success function, from the same primitives based on the classical
jury setting (see for instance Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) or Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998 and 1999)). This way we derive the reduced form of a contest given by equation (1) from
the actions of rational decision-makers.
We start our analysis of the e⁄ects of bias in a game that is very close to the classical Tullock
rent-seeking game. We call this game ￿ benchmark￿because, broadly speaking, it shows that Tul-
lock￿ s conjectures are logically consistent in the sense that we can formalize them by a reasonable
game. A crucial feature of the benchmark is that both lobbies are always active. Despite the fact
that bias never completely deters lobbying activities, the strategic e⁄ects of the contest conform
to Tullock￿ s reasoning. This implies that irrespective of the e¢ ciency criteria used increasing
the accuracy of the politician￿ s information is always e¢ ciency-enhancing: Tullock￿ s statement
is fully supported.
We make then successively two reasonable modi￿cations in the micro-foundations in order to
see how robust this result is. Both games share the a priory desirable feature that in equilibrium
additional information might deter (at least) one interest group from lobbying. This highlights
that it is important whether there can exist situations in which only one interest group might
be deterred from lobbying, because in such situations additional information might increase
competition. Moreover, it turns out to be important whether the equilibrium win probabilities
of the lobbies are related to the likelihood that the lobby supports the correct policy. The
robustness section implies that the e¢ ciency properties of biased contests must be quali￿ed.
This paper bridges two strands of literature. First, there is a literature on contest and rent-
seeking games (see e.g. the surveys by Nitzan (1994) and Konrad (2004)).1 While one of the
1 Some papers in this literature derive, as we do, contest models from micro-foundations (eg. Lazear and
Rosen (1981), the working paper version of Hillman and Riley (1989), Fullerton and McAfee (1999), Baye and
Hoppe (2003) or Corch￿n and Dahm (2006)). However, these models di⁄er from ours in a technical sense (e.g the
elements of the primitives are di⁄erent and/or the underlying uncertainty has a di⁄erent structure). Moreover,
they di⁄er in the interpretations that are determined through the choice of the technical assumptions. There is
also a relationship to probabilistic voting models (Coughlin (1992)). Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998)








 main themes of this literature is the question how to reduce the social waste associated with
rent-seeking activities, it abstracts ￿contrary to the present paper ￿from the informational
aspects of decision-making. Consequently, in this literature e¢ ciency of government is only
measured by social waste. Second, there is a literature on informational lobbying (see e.g. the
survey by Austen-Smith (1997)) and there are recent attempts by Bennedsen and Feldmann
(2006) as well as Dahm and Porteiro (2006a and b) to analyze the incentives of lobbies to
either provide a political decision-maker with policy relevant information or to exert political
pressure (for instance in the form of bribes or campaign contributions). By contrast, the present
paper abstracts from the source of additional information and focusses entirely on the strategic
consequences that more accurate information has on the lobbies￿competition in pressuring a
political decision-maker. Frequently this literature does not analyze the e¢ ciency of government.
When it does it measures it only by the probability of an erroneous decision (see Austen-Smith
and Wright (1992) and Dahm and Porteiro (2006b)) and not through the other criterion.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic model. In this section
we also derive our notion of bias and how we measure e¢ cient government. Section 3 analyzes
the e⁄ect of bias in the benchmark game which essentially con￿rms Tullock￿ s conjecture. Section
4 analyzes the robustness of these ￿ndings and Section 5 o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider the following simpli￿ed version of the classical jury setting. A political decision-maker
is pivotal in a political decision among two policies A and B. There are two states of the world
a and b and we assume that both states are equally likely. We denote by ! the true state of the
world and by D the decision taken. In a world without lobbying the payo⁄s of the politician




b 0 1 ￿ R
with R 2 [0;1]:
2.1 Bias in the Direction of the Correct Decision
In order to capture the best case for investment in information we assume that the politician




the true state of the world.
By abuse of notation we denote the result of the test by t 2 fa;bg. Given our assumption that
initially both states are equally likely, this implies that the probabilities of the states conditional
on a signal are q and 1 ￿ q, respectively:
Pr(! = a j t = a) = q and Pr(! = b j t = a) = 1 ￿ q,
2 In Feddersen and Pesendorfer￿ s language 1 ￿ R re￿ ects the threshold of reasonable doubt. A politician who







 and similarly if t = b. It is easy to check that both signals are equally likely. This setting implies
realistically that if new evidence indicating state b is revealed, the bene￿t R from a correct
match (a;A) must be relatively high to induce that the politician chooses A.
2.2 Lobbying: Micro-Founded Contests
There are two interest groups and by abuse of notation we denote each lobby in the same way
as his preferred policy. Since the ￿nal decision is denoted by D we write, say, D = A if lobby
A succeeds. The stakes of each lobby in the decision are given by VA and VB, respectively.3
W.l.o.g. we assume that VA ￿ VB. Both lobbies are risk neutral, and exert simultaneously e⁄ort
in order to in￿ uence the political decision. We specify later how e⁄ort in￿ uences the politician.
The e⁄ort levels are irreversible and denoted by eA and eB.
The informational assumptions are as follows. The fact that both states are initially equally
likely, and the ￿ quality￿q of the test, are common knowledge. Moreover, the lobbies observe the
result of the test when the politician obtains additional information. Thus, the probability that
the state of the world is a, denoted by pa 2 f1
2;q;1 ￿ qg, is common knowledge (pb is similarly
de￿ned). If there is no additional information this probability is the initial prior pa = 1
2 and
after investment in information it equals the posterior belief pa 2 fq;1 ￿ qg. However, there is
asymmetric information about the payo⁄s of the politician: The decision-maker knows his type
R but the lobbies know only that R is uniformly distributed on the line segment [0;1].4
The timing of the game is sequential. In the ￿rst stage lobbies exert e⁄ort simultaneously.
Given this e⁄ort, the politician makes in the second stage his policy choice. The alternative
chosen is the one that gives the highest payo⁄s to the politician. Thus, this model has a
structure similar to the all-pay auction (see e. g. in Baye et al. (1993 and 1996)). The only
di⁄erence is informational. Lobbies do not know the politician￿ s type.
The fact that lobbies do not know the politicians type when they decide on how much e⁄ort
to exert implies that, although a lobby￿ s e⁄ort may be higher as the one of his opponent, the
lobby may be unsuccessful. Therefore, from the lobby￿ s view point the award of the prize is
non-deterministic. We will see that this gives rise to a contest which is governed by a contest
success function in the sense of equation (1). We derive thus non-deterministic contest games
as the consequence of the actions of rational decision-makers.
3 One interpretation is that, say, lobby A values decision A by VA and decision B with zero. But the lobbies
valuation of the other lobby￿ s preferred policy could also be positive. In this case VA measures how much lobby
A prefers policy A over policy B (and analogously for VB).
4 This is, of course, an assumption we make for simplicity. Generalizations of the distribution function will
a⁄ect the precise functional form of the lobbies￿win probabilities (see the contest success functions derived below).
For instance, if R is distributed according to a symmetric density function, then it is straightforward to see that
the win probabilities will be monotonically increasing transformations of our speci￿cations, since then for a given
R it holds that 1￿F(R) = F(1￿R). However, for this and further generalizations it will still be true that e⁄orts
a⁄ect which type of the politician will be a ￿ threshold￿ -type in the sense that given a vector of e⁄orts all higher







 2.3 E¢ cient Government
In the contest literature the predominant e¢ ciency criterion is the question how much the
contest deters overall lobbying activities as measured by social waste. Hence, as usual, our ￿rst
e¢ ciency criterion is social waste measured by total rent-seeking outlays in equilibrium.5 We
wish to analyze the e⁄ect of more accurate information and need, thus, to compute social waste
in a situation after investment in information in which pa 2 fq;1 ￿ qg. We have
SW(e￿jt) = Pr(t = a)(e￿
A(pa = q) + e￿
B(pa = q)) + Pr(t = b)(e￿







A(pa = q) + e￿
B(pa = q) + e￿




We wish, thus, to establish whether this function is monotonically decreasing (strictly) in the
￿ quality￿q of the additional information. Of course, absent lobbying investment in informa-
tion is never undesirable because by assumption there is no lobbying e⁄ort (or social waste)
independently of the information the decision-maker possesses.
In the literatures on the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)) and
informational lobbying (Austen-Smith and Wright (1992)) the natural criterion to judge the
e¢ ciency of government is the probability of an erroneous decision. Consequently, this proba-
bility will be our second e¢ ciency criterion. Since in equilibrium the contest success function
measures the probability of each decision, we measure it by
Pr(Err) = Pr(! = a)￿B(e￿) + Pr(! = b)￿A(e￿);
the ex ante probability that the ￿ wrong￿policy is chosen. Taking into account additional infor-
mation, we have
Pr(Errjt) = Pr(t = a)
￿
Pr(! = ajt = a)￿
pa=q






Pr(! = ajt = b)￿
pb=q










B (e￿) + (1 ￿ q)￿
pa=q
A (e￿) + (1 ￿ q)￿
pb=q

















Again, we wish to establish whether this function is monotonically decreasing (strictly) in
the ￿ quality￿q of the additional information.
Notice also that ￿absent lobbying ￿this is true. Assuming that R is uniformly distributed
we can calculate the probability of an error ex ante the realization of R as
Pr(Err j t;NoL) = 2q (1 ￿ q) > 0;
which is monotonically decreasing (strictly) in q 2 [1=2;1].6 Thus, absent lobbying under both
criteria there is no reason not to invest in costless information.
5 The underlying assumption necessary to consider the lobbying e⁄orts as real resources wasted is that they
are expenditures on socially unproductive activities.







 3 A Benchmark Game
Consider the following contest success function.




and ￿B(eA;eB) = 1 ￿ ￿A(eA;eB).
Note that in the initial situation when both states are equally likely ￿ simpli￿es to the ￿ clas-
sical￿Tullock contest (with constant returns to scale) which was also proposed in the seminal
article that contained the introductory quote to the present paper.7 The ￿ informational advan-
tage￿of each policy, represented by the probability that the policy is correct, and lobbing e⁄ort
are combined multiplicatively. Since e⁄orts are multiplied by probabilities that may be close
to zero or one, this formulation captures intuitively Tullock￿ s intuition that ￿whoever is on the
right side need not to make very large investments in order to win, and if this is true, the people
on the wrong side will not make very large investments either, because they do not pay.￿We
provide ￿rst a micro-foundation for this contest success function.
Assumption 3.1 Suppose that the politician￿ s payo⁄s from lobbying e⁄orts are given as repre-
sented by the following table:
!nD A B
a eAR 0
b 0 eB(1 ￿ R)
:
Assumption 3.1 captures a simple game in which lobbying increases multiplicatively the
politician￿ s advantage from the lobby￿ s favorite policy independently of the state of the world.8
However, since mismatches between state of the world and policy are normalized to zero, lobbying
relative to the informativeness of the test (1￿q ￿ R ￿ q). In this range better information induces better decisions
since here Pr(Err j t;NoL) = 1 ￿ q. Outside this range the politician is ￿ extreme￿in the sense that he prefers
a policy so much that he ignores contrary evidence through the test. However, as the ￿ quality￿q of the test
improves some ￿ extreme￿politicians also adjust their behavior to the additional information. Thus, also from this
perspective better information induces better decisions.
7 Notice that in this and in Tullock￿ s original formulation ￿but not in De￿nitions 4.1 and 4.2 below ￿ the
contest success function is not well de￿ned when eA = eB = 0. For the moment we postulate, as e.g. in Baye et
al. (1994), that a fair lottery takes place when e⁄orts are zero. However, in Subsection 4.1 we specify a function
that is very similar to De￿nition 3.1 and that takes this criticism explicitly into account. See also the discussion
of this discontinuity in Corch￿n (2000). Note also that, since the prize never remains with the decision-maker,
this contest success function is di⁄erent from the one proposed in Amegashie (2006). This function is similar but
also di⁄erent from the one in Leininger (1993), since there the sum of coe¢ cients of e⁄ort is strictly larger than
one.
8 Notice that when eA = 0 or eB = 0 successful matches between states and policies yield zero payo⁄s for the
politician. This is slightly inconsistent with the table in Section 2. We choose to start with the present game for
simplicity of the equilibrium analysis. But in Subsection 4.1 we present a game yielding very similar predictions
that is fully consistent in this sense. In order to derive the next Lemma we assume that the politician randomizes







 e⁄orts only make a di⁄erence when a policy is matched with the corresponding state of the world.
Comparing the expected payo⁄s of the politician of both policies we have that
E￿(D = A) ￿ E￿(D = B) , paeAR ￿ (1 ￿ pa)eB(1 ￿ R)
, R ￿
(1 ￿ pa)eB
paeA + (1 ￿ pa)eB
￿ ￿ R:
An e⁄ort vector (eA;eB) leads to a winning probability for lobby A of ￿A(eA;eB) = 1 ￿ F( ￿ R).
This implies De￿nition 3.1 and we have the following result.
Lemma 3.1 Assumption 3.1 yields the benchmark contest. That is, lobbies choose e⁄ort as to
maximize equation (1), where ￿i(eA;eB) is speci￿ed in De￿nition 3.1.
We determine now the equilibria of this game. But before doing this we de￿ne a measure





The parameter ^ e 2 [0;1=4] reaches a maximum of 1/4 if paVA = pbVB. This situation can be
considered the ￿ symmetric case￿since a lobby can be ￿ strong￿because he is likely to be right or
because he values the policy much more than the other lobby. In situations of asymmetry (that
is, paVA 6= pbVB), the value of ^ e decreases in the asymmetry of the contest.9 In the case of equal
valuations ^ e is equal to q(1 ￿ q).
Since the objective functions of the lobbies (as speci￿ed in Lemma 3.1) are concave, the ￿rst












This implies that e￿
AVB = e￿
BVA must hold and allows to establish the following result.
Proposition 3.1 For any VA ￿ VB and pa, there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium
to the benchmark game. In this equilibrium the optimal e⁄ort levels are given by e￿
A = ^ eVA and
e￿








Notice that in the initial situation when both states are equally likely ^ e = VAVB=(VA + VB)
2.
This implies that the equilibrium e⁄ort levels and win probabilities coincide with the ones in
the ￿ classical￿Tullock rent-seeking game. Note also that additional information will a⁄ect the
asymmetry of the contest measured by ^ e. Once the decision-maker has obtained additional
information, depending on the test result, we have either pa = q or pa = 1￿q and we can de￿ne
^ e(t = a) and ^ e(t = b) accordingly. In other words, both the optimal e⁄ort level of the lobby
9 To see this note that we can rewrite ^ e = a=(a+1)
2, where a = paVA=(pbVB). This function reaches a unique







 on the ￿ right￿side (who got additional support through the test) and optimal e⁄ort level of the
lobby on the ￿ wrong￿side (whose position was damaged by the test) depend in the same way on
the asymmetry. As proposed by Tullock (in the introductory quote) in response to additional
information both lobbies adjust their equilibrium e⁄ort in the same way. But does this mean
that both lobbies will reduce their equilibrium e⁄ort? Not always, when the informational gain
is not very important (for values of q close to 1/2), if t = a both lobbies reduce their e⁄ort,
but if t = b both interest groups increase their lobbying outlays. Additional information of low
quality has the potential to increase competition when the information acquired goes against
the position of the ￿ stronger￿lobby, the one with the higher valuation. Therefore, although this
contest behaves in many respects as proposed by Tullock, there is in principle room for situations
in which bias decreases the e¢ ciency of government (as measured e.g. by social waste). However,
we turn now to a careful analysis of these e⁄ects on the e¢ ciency of government and show that
such a non-monotonicity cannot occur in this model.
We start by analyzing the e⁄ect of additional information on the probability of an erroneous







qVA + (1 ￿ q)VB
+ (1 ￿ q)
qVA
qVA + (1 ￿ q)VB
+(1 ￿ q)
qVB
(1 ￿ q)VA + qVB
+ q
(1 ￿ q)VA
(1 ￿ q)VA + qVB
￿
=
q(1 ￿ q)(VA + VB)2
2
￿ 1
qVA + (1 ￿ q)VB
+
1














q(1￿q) is strictly increasing in q, the function ￿(q) is strictly decreasing in q.
Consider now the amount of social waste generated through the contest. Given the equilib-

















Again, additional information is bene￿cial and the e⁄ect is monotonic. We summarize this in
the following result.
Proposition 3.2 For any VA ￿ VB and q, in the benchmark game additional information
always (strictly) improves the e¢ ciency of government independently of whether e¢ ciency is
measured by the probability of taking an erroneous decision or by the social waste generated
through the contest. Moreover, the bene￿cial e⁄ect of bias is monotonically increasing (strictly)







 Although bias a⁄ects the asymmetry of the contest and the asymmetry induces both lobbies
either to increase or to decrease their e⁄orts, from an ex ante point of view (before the realization
of the test) additional information is always bene￿cial. The next section studies how general
this result is.
4 Robustness
It is straightforward to modify Assumption 3.1 in order to generalize the game of the previous
section to a family that depends on a positive scalar ￿ analogously to the ￿ classical￿Tullock
rent-seeking game. This yields ￿A(eA;eB) = pae￿
A=(pae￿
A + pbe￿
B). The parameter ￿ speci￿es
how deterministic the contest is and consequently includes (for ￿ = 0) a lottery independent
of the lobbies￿e⁄orts that only depends on the likelihood of the states of the world and (for
￿ ! 1) a ￿ biased￿all-pay auction. As in other contests (for the ￿ classical￿Tullock game see
PØrez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) and for the ratio-form contest see Alcalde and Dahm (2006)),
it is straightforward to check that if ￿ is low enough a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. In





As a result equilibrium e⁄orts are a⁄ected (e￿
A = ^ e(￿)VA and e￿
B = ^ e(￿)VB) but equilibrium win
probabilities are not. Replicating the previous line of reasoning allows to derive an analogous
result to Proposition 3.2 for the generalized benchmark contest.
Despite this robustness to modi￿cations of the contest that maintain the basic functional
form of the contest success function we show now that once this basic functional form is modi￿ed
the contest behaves di⁄erently. The following subsection presents a minor modi￿cation while
Subsection 4.2 speci￿es a larger departure from the benchmark. Both modi￿cations can be
traced back to reasonable changes in the micro-foundations.
4.1 The Multiplicative Tullock Rent-Seeking Game
Suppose we desire to work with a contest success function which is well de￿ned when no lobby
exerts e⁄ort. It is straightforward to modify Assumption 3.1 in order to generate the following
function which represents a minor change to the benchmark.10
De￿nition 4.1 In the multiplicative game the contest success function is given by
￿A(eA;eB) =
pa(1 + eA)
pa(1 + eA) + pb(1 + eB)
and ￿B(eA;eB) = 1 ￿ ￿A(eA;eB).
The equilibria of this contest are very related to the ones of the benchmark game. However,
there is an important di⁄erence: in an interior equilibrium a constant is subtracted from the
equilibrium e⁄ort of the benchmark (case 1 in the next Proposition). Consequently, an interior
10 A payo⁄ table in which the payo⁄s of the four combinations (a;A), (a;B), (b;A), and (b;B) are R(1 + eA),
0, 0, and (1 ￿ R)(1 + eB), respectively, yields De￿nition 4.1. Note that, contrary to Assumption 3.1, this is fully







 equilibrium does not always exist. More precisely, it will cease to exist when additional infor-
mation becomes very precise. Since it is still true that competition is higher when the weaker
lobby obtains support for his position through the test result, there is a region in which after
t = a only lobby A is active while after t = b both groups lobby (case 2). The last possibility is
that lobby B is never active while lobby A is only active when the test is not too precise (case
3). In this region at least lobby B is not active because the informational advantage of one
of the lobbies is too high. Contrary to the benchmark, this makes it possible that bias in the
decision-making process deters lobbying e⁄orts completely. More formally, we have the following
result which is proved in Appendix A.11
Proposition 4.1 For any VA ￿ VB and pa, there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium
to the multiplicative contest. This equilibrium is as follows:
1. [Both lobbies active] If ^ e(t = a)VB ￿ 1, then for all t 2 fa;bg
e￿
A = ^ eVA ￿ 1 e￿






2. If ^ e(t = b)VB ￿ 1 ￿ ^ e(t = a)VB, then:














(b) [Both lobbies active] if t = b, then
e￿
A = ^ eVA ￿ 1 e￿






3. If 1 > ^ e(t = b)VB, then for all t 2 fa;bg:














(b) [No lobby active] if q(1 ￿ q)VA ￿ 1, then
e￿
A = 0 e￿
B = 0
￿A(e￿) = pa ￿B(e￿) = pb:
11 The di⁄erence-form contests analyzed in the literature display the striking feature that in many situations
in a pure strategy equilibrium there is only one player active. Notice that the multiplicative contest (and the
additive game analyzed below) behave very similarly in the sense that whenever the informational advantage of







 This Proposition implies that the comparative statics of the multiplicative game behave in
the same way as the ones of the benchmark as long as in equilibrium both lobbies are active.
However, if the ￿ quality￿of information is high enough this will no longer be true and requires a
careful analysis. We analyze next the e⁄ect of bias on the probability of an erroneous decision.
We have the following result which is again proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 4.2 For any VA ￿ VB and q, in the multiplicative contest additional information
always (strictly) reduces the probability of taking an erroneous decision. Moreover, the bene￿cial
e⁄ect of bias is monotonically increasing (strictly) in the ￿ quality￿q of the additional information.
The intuition for this result is that in equilibrium a lobby￿ s win probability is still related to
the likelihood with which the group defends the ￿ right￿policy. Additional information assures
thus that more often an error in the political decision can be avoided. However, with respect to
social waste the e¢ ciency properties of this model are di⁄erent.
Since in this game su¢ ciently accurate additional information deters lobbying e⁄orts com-
pletely, there are always values for q in which social waste in the multiplicative rent-seeking
game is lower than in the benchmark. However, in this game social waste might be increased
through bias as the next example shows dramatically.
Example 1 Suppose VA = 100 and VB = 100=9. These parameter values imply that there
is no value for q such that both lobbies are active independently of the test result (case 1 in
Proposition 4.1). However, for almost all possible values of q, that is, q 2 [0:5;0:9878], additional
information raises competition when it supports lobby B￿ s position. As a result lobby A is always
active and lobby B only when t = b (case 2). There is a very small interval in which independently
of the test result only lobby A is active, more precisely, for q 2 [0:9878;0:98990] (case 3a) and for
the remaining values of q both lobbies are deterred by the bias (case 3b). Although this increased
competition for intermediate values of q through the test result does not reverse the bene￿cial
e⁄ect of bias on the error probability it does reverse the e⁄ect on social waste (see Figure 1)
To understand the driving force of this example it is useful to remember the discussion
after Proposition 4.1. We mentioned there the potential for a non-monotonicity of total e⁄ort
due to the possibility that ^ e(t = b) increases for some values of q. As it turned out this
non-monotonicity cannot occur in the benchmark game. The multiplicative contest is di⁄erent
because of the possibility that lobby B is not active in equilibrium. The example is chosen such
that ^ e(t = b) increases very strongly on a long interval. This implies that total e⁄ort increases
strongly when t = b is revealed. When t = a is revealed, only lobby A is active and his e⁄ort
decreases according to a di⁄erent functional form. With the parameters chosen the increase
after t = b is much stronger than the reduction after t = a, generating the dramatic increase in
social waste depicted in Figure 1.
To summarize, a slight modi￿cation of the fundamentals of our model yields instead of the
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Figure 1: Social Waste in Example 1
active, in the latter (at least) the ￿ weaker￿lobby might be deterred from lobbying. This has
consequences for the e⁄ect of bias on the e¢ ciency of government:
￿ Providing additional information has the potential to increase competition. The ￿ weaker￿
lobby might obtain additional support and ￿ght harder. The ￿ stronger￿ lobby on the
￿ wrong￿ side might accept the ￿ght instead of giving in. Tullock￿ s reasoning ￿ which
worked in the benchmark ￿does not need to apply and as a result social waste might be
increased in response to bias.
￿ However, there is still a relationship between the lobbies￿equilibrium win probabilities and
the likelihood that they defend the ￿ right￿policy. This assures that bias in the political
decision reduces the probability of an error.
￿ Moreover, it is still true that su¢ ciently accurate information is desirable under both
e¢ ciency criteria. In fact, it is easy to show that as q ! 1 both Pr(Errjt) and SW(e￿jt)
converge to zero.
4.2 The Additive Tullock Rent-Seeking Game
Note that in order to provide a micro-foundation for the multiplicative game a table in which
the payo⁄s of the four combinations (a;A), (a;B), (b;A), and (b;B) are R(1 + eA), 0, 0, and
(1 ￿ R)(1 + eB), respectively, might be used. Although in this formulation e⁄ort multiplies
the payo⁄s of the politician, in some instances we can also think of it as being additive. More
precisely, this is the case when state and policy are matched. However, in the cases in which state







 might be situations in which this is not a desirable assumption. This consideration motivates
the following contest success function.
De￿nition 4.2 In the additive game the contest success function is given by
￿A(eA;eB) =
eA + pa
eA + eB + 1
and ￿B(eA;eB) = 1 ￿ ￿A(eA;eB).
Again, we can recover the standard Tullock contest with constant returns to scale; de￿ning
e0
A = eA + pa and e0
B = eB + pb. The ￿ informational advantage￿of each policy and the lobbing
e⁄ort are combined additively. We provide ￿rst a micro-foundation for this contest.
Assumption 4.1 Suppose that the politician￿ s payo⁄s from lobbying e⁄orts are given as speci￿ed
in the following table:
!nD A B
a R + eAR eB(1 ￿ R)
b eAR 1 ￿ R + eB(1 ￿ R)
Under Assumption 4.1 lobbying increases the payo⁄s independently of the state of the world.
The e⁄ectiveness of lobbying e⁄orts depends on the type R of the politician. Reasoning as before
allows to derive the following result.
Lemma 4.1 Assumption 4.1 yields the additive contest. That is, lobbies choose e⁄ort as to
maximize equation (1), where ￿i(eA;eB) is speci￿ed in De￿nition 4.2.
We determine next the equilibria of this game. Remember that in Tullock￿ s original game












Note that ~ eA ￿ ~ eB holds.
The equilibria of this contest follow the pattern of those of the multiplicative game, because
there are three possible con￿gurations: either both lobbies are active, only one interest group
lobbies or none enters the contest. There are, however, important di⁄erences arising from the
fact that, in the additive game the lobbies￿e⁄ort and their informational advantage are perfect
substitutes. As a result, when both lobbies are active (case 1 in the next Proposition), their
equilibrium e⁄ort is the one in Tullock￿ s original game (~ ei) minus the support received through
information. When this di⁄erence is not positive at least one lobby is deterred from the contest
(case 2), because his informational advantage is higher than what the lobby is willing to bid
given his valuation and the other lobby￿ s e⁄ort. In Appendix A we proof the following result.
Proposition 4.3 For any VA ￿ VB and pa, there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium







 1. [Both lobbies active] If ~ ei ￿ pi for both i 2 fA;Bg, then for both i 2 fA;Bg
e￿
i = ~ ei ￿ pi and ￿i(e￿) = Vi
Vi+Vj:
2. If there exists i 2 fA;Bg such that ~ ei < pi, then:




pkVj ￿ 1 and e￿
k = 0
￿j(e￿) = 1 ￿
q
pk




(b) [No lobby active] if such a j does not exist, then for both i 2 fA;Bg
e￿
i = 0 and ￿i(e￿) = pi:
It is worth to point out that in this game there are strategic e⁄ects which are in line with
Tullock￿ s intuition. Any lobby might abstain because his informational advantage is high enough.
Notice that this is not true in the multiplicative game where (given that one interest group is
active) only the ￿ weaker￿lobby B might be deterred from lobbying.
We turn now to an analysis of the e¢ ciency of government. Suppose, ￿rst, that valuations
are high enough so that after any test result both lobbies are active. This requires, on one hand,
that valuations are high enough and, on the other, that they are symmetric enough as formalized
in the following condition.
Assumption 4.2 The lobbies￿valuations are such that












This assumption implies that valuations can not be too asymmetric because the lower bound
for VB is increasing in VA. Under Assumption 4.2 the expression for the probability of an error
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Consider now the amount of social waste generated through the contest. Given the equilibrium











In both cases additional information has no e⁄ect on the e¢ ciency of government. Each lobby
simply reacts to additional information by maintaining the sum of e⁄ort and informational
advantage constant. This implies that a lobby￿ s equilibrium probability of obtaining the prize
(and, hence, the probability that the political decision taken is erroneous) remains unaltered.
Moreover, since information supporting one side always damages the opposite side, the e⁄ects
on the equilibrium e⁄orts cancel out and total outlays (i.e., social waste) are also constant. We







 Proposition 4.4 Suppose that the lobbies￿valuations are high and symmetric enough such that
Assumption 4.2 holds. For any q, in the additive contest additional information does not a⁄ect
the e¢ ciency of government independently of whether e¢ ciency is measured by the probability
of taking an erroneous decision or by the social waste generated through the contest. However,
individual lobbying behavior is adjusted according to the bias.
One implication of this result is that once we move away from our ideal scenario for informa-
tion acquisition to a world in which additional information is costly, investment in information
is suboptimal for any arbitrarily small cost.
When Assumption 4.2 does not hold it can be shown that an analogous result to Proposition
4.2 holds.12 However, we show now that the strategic e⁄ects of the additive rent-seeking game
induce worse e¢ ciency properties than the ones of the games previously studied. Consider the
following example.
Example 2 Let VA = VB = 2. This implies that ~ eA = ~ eB = 1=2 and therefore in the initial
situation no lobbying takes place. After biasing the contest, however, the situation of one lobby
is necessarily worse than before inducing this lobby to expend resources in the political process.
Depending on the result of the test this lobby is sometimes lobby A (when t = b) and sometimes
lobby B (when t = a). Since both valuations are equal to two, in both cases the active lobby
exerts e⁄ort of
p
2q ￿ 1 > 1 and obtains a win probability of 1 ￿
q
q
2. This implies that social
waste is given by SW(e￿jt) =
p
2q ￿ 1, which is a strictly increasing function of the ￿ quality￿q
of the additional information. Moreover, the probability of an error can be simpli￿ed to




















To summarize, a further slight modi￿cation of the fundamentals of the model leads from the
multiplicative to the additive game. The strategic e⁄ects in the two games are very di⁄erent
because a lobby￿ s informational advantage and e⁄ort are now perfect substitutes. As a result
the capacity of information to increase e¢ ciency is much more limited:
￿ As in the multiplicative game, bias has the potential to increase competition. Contrary
to the multiplicative game, Tullock￿ s intuition applies only partially because the lobby on
the ￿ wrong￿side might ￿ght harder in order to prevent to lose too much ground. Increases
in social waste are not con￿ned only to relative small values of q and social waste might
be monotonically increasing for any ￿ quality￿of additional information. The more precise
additional information is, the more detrimental it might be under this e¢ ciency criterion.







 ￿ Again contrary to the multiplicative game increasing the precision of additional information
does not imply that one lobby is eventually deterred. This might happen but it does not
need to. As a result, even acquiring ex-ante perfect information is not a su¢ cient condition
to ensure a fully accurate decision. In fact, for the parameter values of Example 2, even
if the system has perfect information (q ! 1) the lobbies￿in￿ uence implies that one third
of the times the decision taken is not the correct one.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated the conventional wisdom that in situations in which a political
decision-maker is lobbied by competing interests the e¢ ciency of government can be increased
by providing more accurate information to the decision-maker. We have derived this bias in the
direction of the correct decision from fundamentals of the model that also give rise to the lobbying
game as a contest or rent-seeking game. Our results suggest that whether the conventional
wisdom is true or not is very sensible to the fundamentals of the model. Slight changes in
the micro-foundations generate very di⁄erent strategic e⁄ects and there is no guarantee that
investment in additional information will improve government.
Our analysis has highlighted the importance of the possibility that in biased contests one
lobby does not enter the contest. Since these situations go hand in hand with situations in which
both lobbies abstain from the contest this possibility seems desirable on ￿rst sight. However, it
opens the door to situations in which additional information increases competition. As a result
social waste might be increased. Concerning the second e¢ ciency criterion that we analyze the
e⁄ects of bias seem more e¢ ciency enhancing. Our analysis suggests that additional information
increases the frequency with which the right policy is chosen if there is a relationship between a
lobby￿ s equilibrium win probability and the likelihood that the lobby favors the correct policy.
In many situations this will be the case. However, we have also shown that sometimes such
a relationship does not exist and consequently information provision is undesirable whenever
there is an arbitrary small cost of information. Moreover, there are situations in which even
very precise information cannot prevent wrong decisions to be taken frequently.
We have presented our analysis in a framework that represents only slight departures from
Tullock￿ s classical rent-seeking game as this is the most prominent contest in the literature.
But it is important to point out that our approach can also be used to derive very di⁄erent
games and that there is no reason to believe that in these games the strategic e⁄ects will be
more in line with the ones in the benchmark game. Another prominent class of contest games
are di⁄erence-form contests (see e.g. Che and Gale (2000)). Note that in some circumstances
it might be reasonable to assume that lobbying e⁄orts increase the payo⁄s of the politician
independently of the politician￿ s type R. It is straightforward to see that a payo⁄ table in
which (for any positive scalar s) the payo⁄s of the four combinations (a;A), (a;B), (b;A), and
(b;B) are R + seA, seB, seA, and 1 ￿ R + seB, respectively, yields a biased version of Che







 equilibria only lobby A is active and exerts exactly the amount of e⁄ort necessary to outweigh
the ￿ informational￿advantage of the other lobby. Thus, the ￿ stronger￿lobby wins the contest for
sure and the e¢ ciency of the contest ￿as measured by both criteria ￿does not depend on the
information of the decision maker. In this sense the qualitative properties of the di⁄erence-form
contest when lobby B is deterred from lobbying are similar to the ones of our additive game
when both lobbies are active.
Our main conclusions are also robust under an alternative e¢ ciency criterion. Note that
in the fundamentals of our models (e.g. Assumption 3.1) the e⁄ort of the lobby that does
not get his favored policy is wasted in a di⁄erent sense from the standard notion of social
waste. It is wasted in that it does not yield a bene￿t to the politician. While we could have
speci￿ed a more complicated payo⁄table that, given a policy choice, depends positively on both
lobbies￿e⁄orts, this suggests that alternative de￿nitions of waste in the political process might
be reasonable.13 One such notion might, hence, be the fraction of e⁄ort which is ￿ lost in the






A. Given that this formulation is a part of the
standard notion of social waste it does not reverse our conclusions. Indeed, in Example 2 we
obtain SW0 =
p
2=qSW, which is still strictly increasing in the quality of additional information.
The preceding implies that our approach to derive contest games from micro-foundations
shifts the crucial element in the speci￿cation of the contest from the contest success function to
an assumption relating states of the world, policy choice and the lobby￿ s e⁄ort. This assumption
is not only crucial for the strategic and normative properties of the contest but also for deter-
mining which normative criteria are the ￿ right￿ones. Our work points thus at the importance
of investigating these relationships in future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
The proof builds on the following lemma.
Lemma A.1 For any VA ￿ VB and pa, there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium to
the multiplicative game. This equilibrium is as follows:
1. If ^ eVB ￿ 1, then e￿
A = ^ eVA ￿ 1 and e￿
B = ^ eVB ￿ 1.






B = 0, if papbVA ￿ 1; and
(b) e￿
A = 0 and e￿
B = 0, otherwise.
Proof of Lemma A.1: We show ￿rst that the strategy pro￿le speci￿ed in the statement con-
stitutes an equilibrium. By symmetry consider lobby A￿ s objective function (1), with ￿i(eA;eB)













 The ￿rst order conditions for a maximizer of expected utility imply e￿ = ^ eVA￿1 and e￿ = ^ eVB￿1.
















￿ 0 , ^ eVB ￿ 1.
This proves that when ^ eVB ￿ 1, then e￿ = ^ eVA￿1 and e￿ = ^ eVB￿1 is the unique equilibrium.
Suppose that ^ eVB < 1. The preceding implies that e￿




pa ;0g is an











pb > 0 is not an equilibrium. We proceed by contradiction
and suppose both were an equilibrium. We have that ^ eVA ￿ 1 < papbVB must hold. This implies
(VA)
2 < (paVA + pbVB)
2 or VA < VB, a contradiction which proves the Lemma.
In order to prove Proposition 4.1, note that ^ e(t = b)VB ￿ 1 implies that papbVA = q(1 ￿
q)VA ￿ 1, since because of VA ￿ VB
q(1 ￿ q)VA (VB)
2
((1 ￿ q)VA + qVB)
2 ￿ q(1 ￿ q)VA , VB ￿ (1 ￿ q)VA + qVB
holds. This fact and Lemma A.1 imply Proposition 4.1 Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
It is straightforward to derive the functional form of the probability of an error in the political
decision Pr(Err) from equation (4) for each of the cases in Proposition 4.1 and to check that
it is continuous. The probability of an error in the political decision Pr(Err) in equation (4) is












A (e￿) > ￿
pb=q
A (e￿).
We proceed by analyzing each of the of the cases in Proposition 4.1:

















@q < 0. Since for q = 1=2 we have that
￿
pa=q
A (e￿) = ￿
pb=q
A (e￿) both conditions are ful￿lled.
2. Suppose ^ e(t = b)VB ￿ 1 ￿ ^ e(t = a)VB. If t = a, then ￿
pa=q




















A (e￿) > ￿
pb=q





















A (e￿) = 1 ￿
q
q








@q < 0. Moreover,
￿
pa=q
A (e￿) > ￿
pb=q
A (e￿) , q2VA > (1 ￿ q)2VA,
which is true.
4. The case 1 > ^ e(t = b)VB and q(1 ￿ q)VA < 1 represents a world without lobbying where
we already know that the result holds. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
We show ￿rst that the strategy pro￿le speci￿ed in the statement constitutes an equilibrium.
Consider i;j 2 fA;Bg and j 6= i. For any ej, equation (1), with ￿i(eA;eB) de￿ned as in





(eA + eB + 1)2Vi ￿ 1. (6)







￿ pj for i;j 2 fA;Bg. (7)
Adding the previous expression for both lobbies yields e￿
A + e￿
B + 1 = VAVB
VA+VB. Substituting in
the previous line gives as a unique solution e￿
i = ~ ei ￿ pi for both i 2 fA;Bg. Notice also that if
ej = 0, then the ￿rst order condition of lobby i implies that e￿
i =
p














Vj ￿ 1 ￿ 0 , ~ ej ￿ pj.
This proves that when ~ ei ￿ pi for both i 2 fA;Bg, then e￿
i = ~ ei ￿pi ￿ 0 for both i 2 fA;Bg
is the unique equilibrium. Suppose that there exists i 2 fA;Bg such that ~ ei < pi. The preceding
implies that e￿
i = 0 and e￿
j = maxf
p
piVj ￿ 1;0g is an equilibrium.
Concerning uniqueness, it only remains to prove that e￿
i = 0 and e￿
j =
p




pjVi ￿ 1 > 0 and e￿
j = 0 is not an equilibrium. We proceed by contradiction.
Suppose both were an equilibrium. We have that, on one hand, ~ ei ￿ pi must hold for both
i 2 fA;Bg, while on the other hand, paVB > 1 and pbVA > 1 must be true. Adding the ￿rst two
inequalities yields
~ eA + ~ eB ￿ 1 , VAVB ￿ VA + VB.
Adding the second two inequalities after rewriting them as pa > 1







< 1 , VA + VB < VAVB,
the desired contradiction. Q.E.D.
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